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situation itself is out-of-date. Despite
the book’s 2010 publication date,
twenty-one of the twenty-four essays
here were originally published between
2007 and 2009. Not all these essays are
“expired,” Clark’s being a case in point.
However, the careful reader is forced to
spend far too much time checking other
sources to learn the actual current “state
of play.” In some cases, however, such
as Côte d’Ivoire, the changes from the
time of initial publication to the present
is extreme. In others, such as Zimbabwe, current events have not called
the author’s findings into question.
In the end, despite powerful writing,
careful scholarship, and the best of
intentions, Democratization in Africa is too much of a “fly in amber.”
Teachers, students, and lay readers
alike would be better advised simply
to subscribe to the Journal of Democracy. For a slightly higher cost they
would reap much greater gain.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Cohen, Eliot A. Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles along the Great Warpath That
Made the American Way of War. New York: Free
Press, 2011. 405pp. $30

The American way of war—a product of two centuries of war with . . .
Canada? How can that be? Civil War
history and the experience and history of World War II have driven out
of our minds a truth known to James
Fenimore Cooper, Francis Parkman,
and Kenneth Roberts. The American
colonies, thereafter the United States,
fought battle after battle with France,
Britain, and Canada throughout most
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of the seventeenth century and until the early nineteenth century. The
place of these battles was then called
the Great Warpath, stretching from
Albany to Montreal and Quebec.
American readers who pick up Eliot
Cohen’s Conquered into Liberty will
most likely be embarrassed by learning
how much they do not know (or only
vaguely remember) about American
war fighting in the colonial and early
national periods. However, by the time
the first chapter, about the Schenectady
raid of 1690, is finished, American readers will feel embraced, as though part of
their American selves has been returned.
Non-Americans will be surprised at first,
and by the end of the book astonished.
Cohen teaches strategic studies at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, and he was a
senior adviser to the secretary of state
on strategic issues from 2007 to 2009.
This book is a military history, as good
a one as might ever be done. As a historian, Cohen’s strongest suit is that he
treats war as it is made by political and
military leaders, by the regulars (and irregulars and Native Americans), and by
“leaders and managers who got things
done.” By the last he means those (mostly citizen-soldiers) who improvised in
combat and managed to supply forces
under nearly impossible conditions. His
insights regarding these sorts of men
make up a large part of his understanding of what the “American way of war”
is about. Cohen quotes Germany’s
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel to affirm
that what was an eighteenth-century
American quality has endured—the
American speed of adaptation to
armored warfare, Rommel wrote, is
explained “by their extraordinary sense
for the practical and the material and
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by their complete lack of regard for
tradition and worthless theories.”
American wars along the Great Warpath, Cohen reminds us, were parts
of European wars. The Atlantic Ocean
more linked us to Europe than it
insulated us from it. Moreover, these
wars exposed us to a full range of
seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century
European warfare, from set-piece
battles to what could be called unconventional and secret warfare. They
also brought the full horror of war to
us. Cohen explodes the contemporary
European notion that the United States
did not become “the territory of war”
or exposed to terror until 2001. Indeed,
terror in the form of murderous raids
on New York and New England villages
marked much of its colonial period.
Among many other things, Cohen argues
that the American appetite for the kind
of unconditional surrender pursued by
Franklin Roosevelt in World War II had
its grounding in the eighteenth-century
American intention to destroy the enemy polity that was Canada. More than
that, America’s wars to attach Canada
to itself were wars for the freedom of
that polity. Cohen says, “If any countries
have ever been ‘conquered into liberty,’
as the Continental Congress had written
to the doubtful habitants of Canada
in 1775, they were Germany, Italy, and
Japan, occupied and transformed by
armies that combined, in paradoxical
degree, thoroughness in defeating an
enemy and an unlimited, even naïve,
commitment to liberating him.”
Cohen’s book is an astonishingly
good read in addition to being highly
thoughtful and often revelatory.
KEN JENSEN

McLean, Virginia
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Matzke, Rebecca Berens. Deterrence through
Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy
under Pax Britannica. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska
Press, 2011. 320pp. $45

Historians have long argued about the
true mechanism behind a ninety-year
period of relative peace in Europe, a
period that began with the end of the
Napoleonic wars and became known
as the Pax Britannica. Over the years
critics have questioned both aspects
of this term—whether the period was
actually as peaceful as its title suggests
and whether that peace really was,
in large part, due to Great Britain’s
overwhelming and imposing commercial, industrial, financial, and naval
might. Through a searching analysis of
political decision making during three
different crises within an eight-year
period, Rebecca Matzke’s book, itself a
developed and published version of the
author’s Cornell University dissertation,
seeks to add weight to the notion that
Britain did indeed use the strength and
versatility of the Royal Navy as an effective deterrent force during this time.
The author explains that on three separate occasions between 1838 and 1846
(Canadian trade and border disputes
with the United States, 1838–42; the
Syrian crisis, 1840–41; and the first
Opium War of 1839–42), British politicians, in particular Lord Palmerston,
were not afraid to threaten the use of, or
to use, naval power to further discrete
British interests on the world stage and
to coerce and influence the activities
of their main rivals in Europe. In each
case, while the immediate aim was
obviously to benefit British regional
activities, each was undertaken with
an eye to preserving the broader peace
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